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 Mending ‘Moors’ in Mogador:  Hajj , 
cholera and Spanish–Moroccan 
regeneration, 1890–99 
 Francisco Javier  Martínez 
 Introduction 
 In the summer of 1896, two very diff erent groups of people crammed 
into the tiny 500  × 300 metres uninhabited islet located in front of the 
Moroccan port of Essaouira (Mogador for Europeans, see  Figure 3.1 ). 
Th e fi rst and most numerous group consisted of the 1,653  hajjis (Muslim 
pilgrims) debarked in notoriously insanitary conditions from the 
French steamer  Gergovia , owned by the  Compagnie Fabre et Cie of Mar-
seilles. 1 As the sultans of Morocco had allowed Mogador Island to be 
used as a lazarett o since 1866, 2 the pilgrims were quarantined in this 
site due to suspected cases of cholera. Th e second group was led by the 
Spanish army doctor Enrique Rebolledo, appointed director of the laza-
rett o by the Sanitary Council of Tangier, an international board to 
which the sultans had granted powers to fi ght the importation of epi-
demics since 1844. Rebolledo was accompanied by a team of eleven 
Spanish nurses and auxiliaries, plus seven Moroccan workers and 
eighty-seven Moroccan  askaris (soldiers) for a total of 105 men 3 – with 
the fi nal addition of Ricardo Álvarez, the Council ’ s delegate in Mogador, 
who came and went between the islet and the coast with three Moroc-
can offi  cials and eighteen sailors. In total, nearly 1,800 people occupied 
Mogador Island between 21 and 28 July 1896. 4 
 Th is was not an isolated event. During the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, the saintly halo of  baraka earned with the  Hajj no longer 
prevented ever-increasing numbers of Muslim pilgrims from being 
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quarantined. Th e leading role of international health bodies and foreign 
doctors in this process has led to the belief that this was solely a conse-
quence of European imperialism. Th us, Michael C. Low has argued that 
the real or perceived political and sanitary risks Europeans att ached to 
the  Hajj  merged in a pathologising narrative of ‘twin infection’ by Pan-
Islamism and epidemics which stood behind Europe ’ s mounting inter-
vention in Islamic countries in that period. 5 Actually, we think this 
narrative was also appropriated by local Islamic rulers whose moderni-
sation plans could be equally hindered by either religious radicalism or 
incontrollable disease. Pilgrims were therefore suspected of importing 
 Figure 3.1  Location and present-day state of Mogador Island. 
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ideas capable of triggering revolts not just against European imperial-
ism, but also against the reforms promoted by those rulers (sultans, 
beys or khedives) and against their traditional religious authority. It was 
also believed that the disease they carried in their bodies would threaten 
not just Europe ’ s strong containment eff orts, but also the more fragile 
measures promoted by Islamic governments to protect their population 
against the ravages of cholera or plague. 
 In this context, the sanitary discourses and practices towards the 
Mecca pilgrimage had certain remarkable specifi cities in Morocco. Th is 
was probably due to the Alawite sultanate ’ s peripheral status with regard 
to the  Hajj and to European imperialism – as occurred in the case of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which Christian Promitzer analyses in  Chapter 6 
of this volume. Building on previous studies, we will study such specifi -
cities for the period of the 1890s. Th ough formally subject to multiple 
European interventions, the Moroccan  Hajj  became then mostly a 
Spanish-controlled aff air, framed within a short-lived imperialist project 
of ‘regeneration’ by which Spain sought to acquire a hegemonic stand 
over the ‘civilising mission’ designs of their European rivals. 6 We will 
also analyse how such regeneration required the social production and 
protection of ‘Moors’, imagined as a modernised, Hispanophile and 
healthy elite eager to support, and actually expected to participate, in 
Spanish–Moroccan reforms – including public health reforms. Th is sin-
gular example of what Alison Bashford has dubbed ‘imperial hygiene’ 
– European domination of African and Asian societies by means of 
sanitation and cleanliness – had in the tiny Mogador Island one of its 
main material and symbolic sites. 7 
 Regenerating Morocco into an ‘African Spain’ 
 Experts on Moroccan history, including many Spanish historians, 
usually assimilate, implicitly or explicitly, the nature of Spain ’ s imperi-
alism in Morocco into the one deployed by its more powerful competi-
tors: Britain and France. Th e success of nineteenth-century British and 
especially twentieth-century French plans in the Maghreb therefore 
results in an image of Spanish initiatives oscillating between the ludi-
crous and the violent or, more oft en, in their being despised as largely 
non-existent or irrelevant – to such an extent that one might wonder 
how Spain ever managed to take hold of part of Morocco at all. 8 In 
our opinion, historiography has generally failed to grasp a fundamental 
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contradiction in Spanish–Moroccan contemporary relations. Spain was 
a main European imperialist power in nineteenth-century Morocco, 
seriously challenging France and Britain for hegemony in the years 
following the Spanish–Moroccan War of 1859–60 and in the decade 
preceding the loss of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898; yet, Spain could 
only deploy specifi c, unconventional models of imperialist interven-
tion owing to its modest economic and military power, its ranking as a 
secondary actor in international politics as well as its secular historical 
and cultural ties with Morocco. 
 During the 1890s, the second and last occasion in which Spain was 
well positioned to gain control over the whole of Morocco, Spanish 
policy relied mostly on a ‘regeneration’ project instead of the dominant 
‘civilisation’ scheme which Great Britain and France wished to deploy 
in the Alawite sultanate – and were already practising in large parts 
of Africa and Asia. 9 Th e singularity of ‘regeneration’ as an imperialist 
model derived from its having been originally conceived for interven-
tion in Spain itself. Since the 1870s, even earlier, regeneration had been 
put forward by some intellectual and political actors as an urgently 
required drive towards modernisation to end the country ’ s centuries-
long ‘decay’. 10 Such a drive required deep changes in the political regime, 
the state administration, the army, agriculture, industry, education and 
science. In the beginning, advocates of regeneration called for the 
expansion of existing colonies and the acquisition of new ones as a nec-
essary complement for reforms at home. However, by the mid 1880s, 
renowned personalities such as Joaquín Costa (1846–1911) saw that 
an eventual success of regeneration in Spain would closely depend on 
the ability to deploy a similar intervention scheme over non-European 
societies, in particular over Spain ’ s southern neighbour. Costa argued 
in a famous rally held at the Alhambra theatre of Madrid in 1884 that 
Morocco was
 a country in decay, as we decayed too, and which, as ourselves, can 
regenerate itself and restore the splendour of those two African Athens: 
Fez and Marrakech. [We should help Morocco to] regenerate itself so 
completely that [it becomes] a virile, independent, cultivated nation, 
naturally allied with Spain. 11 
 Costa ’ s utopianism was bound to fail in real politics . However, the 
Liberal Party cabinet which rose to power in November 1885, with 
the regenerationist and ‘Africanist’ Segismundo Moret (1833–1913) 
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as Minister of Foreign Aff airs, sought to put into practice some prag-
matic and feasible measures that the  Sociedad Española de Afr icanistas 
y Colonistas (Spanish Society of Africanists and Colonists, SSAC) had 
picked up from the speeches of Costa and several other speakers in 
the Alhambra rally. As with Costa, the SSAC sought to encourage ‘the 
regeneration of that country [Morocco] and its fraternal union with 
Spain’, 12 but its ultimate goal, according to President Francisco Coello 
(1822–98), was to make of
 that rag of a nation a great people […] fraternally united with Spain 
through the ties of education, a common mentality and the harmony 
of interests, as it already is by the ties of tradition, climate and blood, 
in such a way that, without losing its own personality, it substantially 
reproduces the features of the Spanish nationality, becoming a sort of 
African Spain. 13 
 Th e creation of this ‘African Spain’ would not respect Morocco ’ s sover-
eignty as much as Costa ’ s proposals, but it would not imply a thorough 
dismantling of the Moroccan state, army, economy or education system 
either. Instead, it would build upon ongoing local reforms and moderni-
sation projects of Sultan Hassan I (1873–94), who was decidedly fol-
lowing the steps of his predecessors on the Moroccan throne, as well as 
the pioneering example of the Ott oman Empire ’ s  tanzimat  and of 
Muhammad Ali ’ s reforms in Egypt. It is true that regeneration was to 
be led by an elite of Spanish experts (diplomats, army offi  cers, physi-
cians, engineers, teachers, entrepreneurs) occupying key power posi-
tions within the Moroccan state apparatus. Nonetheless, it also implied 
a commitment to the creation of local institutions to train an elite of 
modern experts who would play leading roles alongside Spaniards. In 
Costa ’ s words, Spain:
 sought a foothold for reforms in Moroccan youth by training a genera-
tion of physicians, engineers, industrialists, army offi  cers and jurists pos-
sessing all the tastes, the competences and the abilities of modern 
[European] culture. 14 
 Although actual Spanish initiatives would not produce ‘a generation’ of 
Moroccan modern experts as Costa, again, hyperbolically imagined, 
they trained a non-negligible number of them. Th e most important 
projects were based in Tangier, the real ‘centre of power’ of late nine-
teenth-century Morocco 15 and the dreamed capital of the future ‘African 
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Spain’ (all Europeans imagined Tangier as the capital of their own colo-
nial Morocco). 16 Largely forgott en today, several regenerationist pro-
jects were launched during the late 1880s and 1890s with the active 
collaboration of Moroccan authorities and elites. For example, a  Cámara 
de Comercio (Chamber of Commerce), set up in 1888 for encouraging 
bilateral economic intercourse and composed of Spaniards and Moroc-
cans – mostly Jews but some Muslims too. Th e army doctor Felipe 
Óvilo (1850–1909) ( Figure 3.2 ), a member of the SSAC and close 
personal friend of Moret – who actually appointed him military att aché 
in Tangier in 1886 – was instrumental in its creation. During his ten-
year term of offi  ce, Óvilo would intervene in many other projects. He 
founded and directed the  Escuela de Medicina  (medical school) in 1886, 
which turned into an offi  cial training centre for Moroccan army physi-
cians four years later, with some fi ft een to twenty students att ending 
lectures until its closure in 1904. 17 He also set up a  Sociedad de Salva-
mento de Náufr agos (Lifeboat Society) in 1888 for shipwreck rescue in 
the Gibraltar Strait and took steps to create a Moroccan ‘Red Cross’ in 
the late 1890s. 18 He worked in the new Spanish Hospital (1888), built 
and managed by Franciscan friars, funded by the Ministry of Foreign 
Aff airs and admitt ing European and Moroccan patients, and was co-
founder and member of the  Comisión de Higiene (Local Health Board) 
(1888) in which his colleague Severo Cenarro (1853–98), army doctor 
att ached to the Spanish consulate, acted as permanent secretary. 19 
 Óvilo and Cenarro were involved in two other ambitious projects. 
One was a hybrid  Academia Militar/Escuela de Artes y Ofi cios (Military 
Academy/Technical School) for training both Moroccan military offi  c-
ers and civil technicians, and the other was an  Instituto de Enseñanza 
Secundaria (High School) for Spanish and Moroccan pupils. Both 
would be interrupted around 1890. 20 Otherwise, the Franciscan Cath-
olic Mission directed by José Lerchundi (1836–96) opened primary 
schools for girls and boys in the early 1880s, some of whose pupils and 
teachers were Moroccan. It also founded a ‘Hispano-Arabic’ printing 
house in 1880, constructed a working-class neighbourhood (San Fran-
cisco) in 1888, with adjacent factories employing residents, and built and 
managed both the old and new Spanish hospitals opened in 1881 and 
1888 respectively. Lerchundi also set up an  Escuela de Estudios Árabes 
(School of Arabic Studies) in nearby Tetouan in 1886 for the training 
of Spanish and Moroccan experts in Arabic language and culture. 21 
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 Figure 3.2  Portrait of Felipe Óvilo in ‘Moorish’ dress in Marrakech, by 
Enrique Simonet, 1894. 
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Finally, private entrepreneurs also made signifi cant contributions to 
regeneration plans. Th us, Emilio Rotondo installed Tangier ’ s fi rst tele-
phone network in 1887 (later, Larache ’ s and Rabat ’ s) operated by a staff  
comprising Moroccan Muslim and Jewish technicians, while Abelardo 
Sastre set up a large farm called  El Mediar from where he annually 
exported hundreds of catt le heads to Gibraltar, Barcelona and Marseille 
and in which he employed Spanish and Moroccan workers. 22 
 It should be pointed out that plans to turn Morocco into an ‘African 
Spain’ were not exclusively advanced by the progressive sectors in 
Spanish society. Conservative groups promoted an alternative under-
standing of that goal as well as alternative strategies for att aining it. 
Th us, Manuel Olivié, a lawyer and politician committ ed to overseas 
expansionism, argued that Spain should follow the nineteenth-century 
European trend of ‘creating large states composed of a plurality of 
nations sharing strong ethnic, geographical and historical features’. 23 
Spain had ‘the duty of merging into a single [Spanish] state’ Morocco, 
Portugal and Gibraltar. 24 With regard to the sultanate, ‘there is no other 
option but to assimilate Morocco to us, so that the sentiment of a shared 
homeland extends from the Pyrenees to the sands of the Sahara’. 25 Th is 
would create a trans-Mediterranean polity occupying both sides of the 
Strait of Gibraltar, composed of a ‘European Spain and [an] African 
Spain harmoniously tied by social assimilation’. 26 Olivié imagined this 
as a European-style state-building process rather than as an imperial 
enterprise – it would actually prevent the ‘real’ colonisation of Morocco 
by more powerful European countries. In his view,
 Spain, by extending its laws to the Atlas, undertakes a venture analogous 
to those of Germany and Italy, by redeeming Moroccans from the 
tyranny and anarchy in which they live, and from European infl uences, 
which regard that territory as a business haven. 27 
 Olivié ’ s projects, in contrast to regeneration, left  litt le or no space for 
Moroccan agency in the creation of an ‘African Spain’. Th ey were more 
in tune with projects such as the establishment of a ‘royal protectorate’ 
over the Saharan coast south of Cape Juby obtained by Spanish agents 
in 1885. Despite all this, Spanish late nineteenth-century imperialism 
in Morocco, either progressive or conservative, did not demand such 
disrupting transformations as British and French civilising schemes 
did. 28 In this sense, although Khaled ben Shrir and other historians have 
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ascribed the ‘reforms’ experienced by Morocco to British policy – 
during the long term of offi  ce of the diplomat John Drummond-Hay 
(1845–86) 29 – the main diff erence between British and Spanish reforms 
lay in the agency the latt er allowed to local elites. Th e ‘civilising mission’ 
implied a systematic subalternisation of Moroccans in dependent roles 
under the lead of foreign experts monopolising knowledge and power. 
Spanish regeneration schemes, by contrast, committ ed themselves to 
train Moroccan experts and create modern local institutions, two things 
the British never att empted to do in Morocco, not even in nearby 
Gibraltar where dozens of Moroccans received only basic military or 
medical training. In addition, from the late 1880s, Britain openly 
despised reforms, its Moroccan policy consisting in lobbying the sultan 
and the higher government offi  cials by way of infl uential agents, such 
as Sir Harry Maclean, in order to advance British economic and diplo-
matic interests. 30 
 The Mogador Island lazaretto and Spanish–Moroccan 
sanitary borders 
 Public health reform was one important goal of Spanish regeneration 
in Morocco. Despite what many historians continue to argue, the 
country did not completely lack a modern sanitary administration. 31 
Following general developments in the Arab-Islamic Mediterranean, 
especially in the Ott oman Empire and Egypt, an embryonic quarantine 
system had been put in operation during the nineteenth century as a 
combined outcome of local reforms and international pressure. 32 At the 
top of it stood the International Sanitary Council of Morocco (also 
known as the Sanitary Council of Tangier due to its being located in 
this town), to which Sultan Abderrahman ibn Hicham granted powers 
in 1840 to ensure ‘the maintenance of public health over the empire ’ s 
seaboard, to draft  all regulations and take all measures to carry out this 
task’. 33 Th e Council had been preceded by a board called  Junta de Cón-
sules , set up in 1792 – as Malika Ezzahidi points out in  Chapter 4 – and 
it was composed of the diplomatic representatives of Britain, France, 
Prussia (later Germany), Spain, Piedmont-Sardinia (later Italy), 
Belgium, Portugal, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Sweden and the United 
States, who occupied its presidency in turns, and was a consultative 
body entitled to propose to the sultan (by way of his representative in 
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Tangier, the  naib ) measures against the importation and diff usion of 
‘exotic’ epidemic diseases, originally cholera and, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, bubonic plague too. Council delegations were soon 
established in the ports open to international commerce (Tetouan, 
Larache, Rabat, Casablanca, Mazagan, Safi , Mogador) and doctors of 
several European nationalities began to act as  medicos de sanidad  or 
 consultores médicos  (medical advisors) of the Council and its delega-
tions. From the end of the Spanish–Moroccan War until 1899 the head 
position in Tangier was monopolised by Spanish physicians, among 
whom were Óvilo (1877–78) and Cenarro (1884–97). 
 Certainly, this quarantine administration was insuffi  ciently ‘medical-
ised’. For example, the Council was not obliged to follow the technical 
advice of its medical advisors because only diplomats were offi  cial 
members. It was only natural that, as Óvilo explained in  De l ’ infl uence 
des pèlerinages marocains à la Mecque sur la propagation du choléra 
 (1882), ‘in most occasions, the Council debates and takes decisions 
without the participation of its medical adviser’. 34 In the same vein, the 
sultan could always ignore the Council ’ s suggestions for he had never 
turned over the executive authority on sanitary matt ers to foreign dip-
lomats. Th us, in 1878, aft er Óvilo ’ s proposed measures for preventing 
the diff usion of cholera from the interior of the country to the main 
ports (the ban on that year ’ s pilgrimage to Mecca and the establishment 
of inland sanitary cordons and fi eld lazarett os around the main ports) 
had been accepted by the Council and Hassan I, the sultan
 who backed the measures taken by the Sanitary Council, had deployed 
troops to execute them and had created a new tax ‘for lazarett os’, to 
provide funds for sanitary cordons, revoked these salutary measures 
through a  dahir [decree] by the end of September and […] the whole 
edifi ce built with countless eff orts crumbled in a single day. 35 
 Th e weak medicalisation of Moroccan quarantines was also due to the 
lack of proper facilities and equipment. Th e only lazarett o existing in 
the country, Mogador Island, was inappropriate for the task. Sultan 
Mohammed IV had agreed to the site being used to confi ne suspect 
Mecca pilgrims in 1866 36 aft er projects and demands for sanitary use 
dating back at least to 1821. 37 Mohammed El-Bezzaz has explained how 
the serious threat posed by the fourth cholera pandemic, combined 
with Spanish pressure following the third ISC in Constantinople in 
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1866, led the sultan to allow quarantines in Mogador Island through a 
 dahir issued on 18 November of that year. 38 However, the site had 
neither a disinfection stove, nor a barrack for the diseased, nor a pavil-
ion where the healthy pilgrims might be lodged. According to Óvilo, 
pilgrims just spent ‘from three to ten days on the [island ’ s] reefs, aft er 
which they move to the mainland’. 39 Th ere was no quay where ships 
could safely moor and unload their passengers and baggage regardless 
of weather conditions. Th e proximity to the coast and the city (less than 
a mile off ) added to the risk of people escaping and spreading diseases 
inland. Last but not least, as the Irish doctor Arthur Leared pointed out, 
ships normally bound for Tangier were
 compelled […] to proceed to this place [Mogador Island], nearly four 
hundred miles further. Th is, and justly, has been considered a great griev-
ance, though it is one which at present admits no remedy. 40 
 To avoid this, ships that had been put under quarantine of observation 
in Tangier oft en escaped from the bay, rounded Cape Spartel and dis-
embarked their passengers on various spots of the Atlantic coast. 41 It 
was only from 1890, when Spanish regeneration plans promoted the 
modernisation of the Moroccan sanitary administration, that the laza-
rett o was equipped and put to regular use. In September of that year, 
the French steamer  Gallia arrived at Tangier with 700 pilgrims and a 
foul bill of health. 42 Th e Council ’ s delegate visited the ship several times 
and noted the bad conditions on board, with hunger-stricken passen-
gers crammed on deck. Cenarro and the British and French ministers 
in Tangier also approached the  Gallia , and aft er dramatic scenes of 
panic and violence triggered by the distribution of ‘an insuffi  cient quan-
tity of bread and a few olives’ it was decided that the steamer should 
undergo a six-day quarantine at Mogador Island. 43 Cenarro appointed 
the Spanish doctor Gustavo Prieto, a regular visitor to Moroccan port 
towns from nearby Cádiz, as the lazarett o ’ s director. Four  gardiens sani-
taires accompanied him, later joined by twenty-fi ve soldiers sent by 
Mogador ’ s  qaid (military governor). A translator could have been used 
too, on this and on subsequent occasions – Hamed Romani, a physician 
trained by Óvilo in Tangier, who had taken care of Moroccan pilgrims 
travelling to Mecca in the previous year ’ s  Hajj. 44 Prieto was charged 
with the task of quarantining the pilgrims and disinfecting their luggage, 
for which purpose he took with him ‘a well-supplied medicine chest 
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and appropriate disinfectants’. 45 He was given a hard time. Military 
protection did not stop the pilgrims from revolting against disinfection 
procedures and threatening to att ack him or swim to the coast. Th ings 
fi nally calmed down and no cholera outbreak occurred. 
 Th e quarantine procedure was continued and developed in the fol-
lowing years. Cenarro commissioned Prieto again in late August 1891 
to deal with the pilgrims of the French steamer  Sahel , arriving from 
Alexandria, who were suspected of cholera despite ‘having undergone 
the quarantine and disinfection imposed on the arrivals from Arabia at 
the El Tor lazarett o’. 46 Again, no case of cholera was declared at Mogador 
Island. Th e following year the pilgrims posed no epidemic risk, but all 
alarms went off  in 1893 aft er the ‘greatest outbreak [of cholera] ever at 
Mecca since 1865’. 47 Th is time, Cenarro managed to get permission 
from the Council so that Prieto and another Spanish doctor, Sotero 
García de Mayoral, with  gardiens sanitaires and disinfectants, were sent 
one month in advance of the expected arrival of pilgrims to organise 
the lazarett o and prepare the city of Mogador itself. 48 By the end of 
August, the French ships  Gallia and  Lutetia and the British  Afghan 
disembarked 1,550 pilgrims. 49 Despite preparations, cholera broke out, 
causing eight deaths among the thirty-fi ve declared cases. 50 Th is emer-
gency obliged Cenarro to travel personally to the island, accompanied 
by two other Spanish physicians, Dr Jiménez and José Prieto (Gustavo ’ s 
brother), plus eight Spanish medical auxiliaries. 51 Th e total Spanish and 
Moroccan staff  reached 211 people, of which at least 100 were soldiers. 52 
When quarantine was over, the British Vice-Consul in Mogador, Robert 
Lyon Nelson Johnston, criticised the shortcomings of the lazarett o in a 
report addressed to the British minister in Tangier. He believed the 
island had received too many people, was too close to the shore and 
proved too diffi  cult to supply with water and food. Besides, Moroccan 
soldiers were reluctant to protect the medical personnel, threatened by 
pilgrims ‘with violence if they persisted in the treatment of the sick, 
fumigation of clothes, etc.’. 53 
 Th e year 1894 went by with no risk of cholera, but in 1895, following 
another serious outbreak in Mecca that ‘reproduced in a smaller scale’ 
the one that had occurred two years before, 54 the Sanitary Council 
appointed the Spanish army doctor Enrique Rebolledo as director of 
the lazarett o and sent him there in March to start preparations. He 
was expected to remain on Mogador Island until December of the 
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same year. 55 But when the French ship  Maurice et Réunion asked for 
permission to disembark 750 pilgrims in Tangier in late August, the 
Council surprisingly conceded aft er pressure from French authorities, 
who insisted that all passengers were in good health aft er having been 
inspected in Algier ’ s Matifou lazarett o. Cholera broke out in Tangier, 
causing over 400 deaths, and subsequently spread to Tetouan, Fez 
and other cities. 56 In early October, Cenarro presented a report on 
the epidemic to the Council in which he suggested that cholera had 
been imported by the  Maurice et Réunion and demanded the establish-
ment of a permanent lazarett o at Mogador Island as the best way to 
protect the country against the disease. 57 In this way, Spain was trying 
to institutionalise the measures deployed in previous years, which had 
hitherto received no offi  cial sanction, neither by the sultan, nor by the 
Council. France opposed Spanish plans. Th e French minister denied 
the importation of the disease by the French ship based on reports 
draft ed by Dr Spivakoff , director of the French Hospital in Tangier, and 
Dr Henri Soulié, director of the recently founded Pasteur Institute of 
Algiers, who had been sent on an offi  cial mission to Morocco to study 
the epidemic. 58 
 Th e British also showed litt le enthusiasm for Mogador Island. 
However, the head of British diplomacy in Morocco, Sir Arthur Nicol-
son, visited the island in March 1896 accompanied by the Gibraltar-
based Surgeon-Major MacPherson, to check the site ’ s conditions before 
the new pilgrimage season. 59 Th e latt er ’ s report showed a signifi cant 
improvement of facilities on the island over the previous years. A house 
had been built for the doctor and auxiliaries. Th e six artillery batt eries 
on the island ’ s perimeter had been repaired and equipped with under-
ground water tanks for collecting rainwater. A baking oven had been set 
up in one of them. Th ree bigger water tanks had been additionally built 
in the centre of the island, while in its northwest corner an area had 
been allott ed to serve as cemetery. As a result, and despite claiming for 
further works, MacPherson judged the island ‘not unsuited for the pur-
poses of a lazarett o’ and capable of containing up to 3,000 people for 
two months. 60 Th is favourable opinion would be confi rmed when the 
lazarett o was used later that year, as shown in this chapter ’ s introduc-
tion. 61 Dr Rebolledo was sent again well in advance. A hundred conical 
tents for lodging healthy pilgrims were mounted, probably following a 
suggestion in MacPherson ’ s report. 62 Infectious patients (with smallpox 
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or dysentery, for no cases of cholera appeared) were treated in separate 
tents and assisted by separate staff . Pilgrims ’ clothes and luggage were 
disinfected with ‘sulfuric vapours’ in a stove installed in one of the bat-
teries. Aft er fi ve days with no cases of cholera, quarantine was declared 
over, 63 the fi nest operation in the thirty years of existence of Mogador 
Island ’ s lazarett o. On the basis of Rebolledo ’ s experience, a  Projet de 
règlement général pour le service de quarantaine dans l ’ île de Mogador  was 
draft ed, though it would never come into force ( Figure 3.3 ). 64 
 Th e weakening of Spain ’ s position in Morocco aft er the onset of the 
last war for Cuban independence in February 1895 probably stood 
behind this failure – and behind the surprising decision of the Council 
that triggered the Tangier epidemic. Debility would bring more trou-
bles for Spanish plans. In March of 1897, Sultan Abdelaziz (1894–1908) 
– actually Regent Ba Ahmed (the sultan was still a minor) – forbade 
the pilgrimage to Mecca due to the heightened risk of importing plague, 
which had broken out in Hong Kong in 1894 and was spreading rapidly 
towards Europe aft er striking British India and Mecca. 65 Such a radical 
measure had been att empted in Morocco only once since the times of 
Moulay Slimane (1792–1822) – by Óvilo in 1878, as we said before – 
because of the potential damage European interference in religious 
matt ers was likely to cause to the sultan ’ s prestige. 66 Th is initiative was 
inconsistent with the strategy Spain had followed during the decade, 
and it is likely that it was promoted by France, which, according to 
Valeska Huber, ‘oft en resorted to the complete prohibition of the pil-
grimage’ in its imperial possessions. 67 But Ba Ahmed sought to coun-
terbalance the negative political eff ects of his unwilling decision by 
building a permanent state prison in Mogador Island. 68 Given that the 
ban on pilgrimage did not prevent a number of Moroccan  hajjis from 
travelling to Mecca, the Council, aft er sending a medical advisor to the 
island, asked the regent to remove the prison so that the site was fully 
available in case of emergency. 69 Ba Ahmed opposed this and frictions 
escalated with the Council ’ s refusal to admit in Moroccan ports (save 
for Tangier) any ship carrying pilgrims who could not prove fulfi lment 
of certain strict formalities. 70 Th e measure was kept in force until 1900, 
though it was impossible in practice to force navigation companies to 
comply with it. 71 
 Th ese problems anticipated the abrupt end of Spanish plans for the 
Mogador Island lazarett o. Th e ban on the pilgrimage was lift ed in early 
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 Figure 3.3  Projet de règlement général pour le service de quarantaine dans l ’ île 
de Mogador , 1896. 
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1898 as the risk of importing plague was low, but the new prison con-
tinued to deprive the Council of its only quarantine facility. Th e French 
negotiated on their own with the Moroccan Government so that the 
northern half of the island was used again for sanitary purposes. 72 Dr 
François was positive about this possibility aft er visiting the site in 
March and drew a map of the eventual partition ( Figure 3.4 ). 73 However, 
aft er some give and take, Moroccan authorities decided on a further 
reduction of the space for an eventual quarantine. Th e Council ’ s new 
medical advisor, the Spanish army doctor Joaquín Cortés, who had 
replaced Cenarro aft er his sudden death in January, travelled to Mogador 
Island in late 1898 to evaluate the new project, which he rejected. 74 In 
parallel, Ba Ahmed had proposed three alternative sites for a lazarett o: 
the island of Perejil/Turah, in the vicinity of Ceuta; the ruins of old 
Tangier ( Tanjah el-Bali ), in a secluded spot of the bay; and the village 
of Fedala-Mohammedia, close to Casablanca. 75 Th e Council judged 
none of them as suitable. 76 
 At the end of 1898, bubonic plague struck Mecca again and, thus, 
threatened once more to reach Europe and North Africa. In February 
1899, alarmed European diplomats in Tangier considered forcing Ba 
Ahmad to impose a new ban on the  Hajj , but fi nally let go of the idea 
as most pilgrims had already left  for Mecca. 77 Th ey insisted, however, 
on the closure of the prison and, as Moroccan authorities refused, they 
even envisaged an eventual military occupation of Mogador Island. 78 
Th ings would not go that far and fi nally, in June, Ba Ahmed agreed 
to shut down the prison and, in principle, to allow the building of 
a permanent lazarett o. 79 Th ere was not much time left  to have eve-
rything ready before the return of pilgrims, but the Council acted 
swift ly. Cortés, who had drawn for his own personal use a sketch of 
the ‘whole facility’, 80 arrived at the island on 4 August to supervise 
the works, which included the installation of twenty ‘wooden sheds’ 
fabricated in Tangier fi t for lodging fi ft y pilgrims each. 81 He appointed 
the Spanish Navy doctor Alfonso Cerdeira as the lazarett o ’ s director. 82 
Nearly 44,000 francs of a projected 100,000 budget would be spent 
between July and September on the salaries of three physicians and 
dozens of auxiliaries and workers, plus the purchase and transport of ‘a 
disinfecting oven’. 83 
 A fi rst group of 419 pilgrims 84 disembarked on 9 August from the 
Turkish steamer  Abdelkader  and endured quarantine with no cases 
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 Figure 3.4  Plan of Mogador Island with the quarantine organisation 
proposed by Dr François, 9 March 1898. 
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of plague. 85 Before the expected new arrivals, works continued to fi x 
various problems: the disinfecting oven had not been used for lack 
of a specifi c room; only a few sheds had been built. However, on 15 
August, the  qaid of Mogador ordered Moroccan workers to stop all 
activity and, on the 27th, his soldiers tore down the twelve wooden 
sheds already put up and forced Cortés to leave the island. 86 Although 
the French minister in Tangier condemned the ‘arbitrariness’ of Moroc-
can measures, the French consul in Mogador had complained about 
Cortés acting unilaterally and not providing information on the quar-
antine. 87 Th e French rose to the occasion and proposed that Cortés 
be ‘removed’ from all quarantine tasks; 88 he would be the last Spanish 
doctor to act as the Council ’ s medical advisor. Ba Ahmed ordered that 
henceforth the directors of the lazarett o were to be physicians ‘non-
resident’ in Morocco. 89 In practice, this opened the door for French 
doctors to replace Spaniards. Lucien Raynaud (1866–1931) of Algiers 
would be appointed in 1900 and consolidated France ’ s increasing 
control of the Moroccan sanitary administration. Although Moroccan 
offi  cials usually accompanied him – at least on one occasion by an 
army doctor trained by Óvilo in Tangier and on another one by Zubeir 
Skirej, a military engineer trained in England – he rejected or ignored 
them. 90 In his infl uential book  Étude sur l ’ hygiène et la médecine au Maroc 
 (1900), Raynaud ignored as well the quarantines organised by Spanish 
doctors during the 1890s, which he downplayed by affi  rming that aft er 
1865 Mogador Island ‘has hardly been used a dozen times’. 91 He did 
not mention the name of any of the doctors who had preceded him 
in the post. 
 Th e events of 1899 became the last and most serious att empt at build-
ing a permanent lazarett o on Mogador Island. For ten years, Spanish 
regeneration initiatives managed to put the site to regular sanitary use, 
appoint medical directors and auxiliary staff  as well as construct facili-
ties and install technical equipment. In general, Spain had signifi cantly 
advanced its project of sett ing up a modern quarantine administration 
in Morocco, centralised in Tangier, with autonomous executive power 
based on medical personnel and sanitary facilities which intended to 
reach a good part of the country ’ s maritime borders. All this eff ort 
should be understood, in any case, as part of the imperialist project 
of Spanish–Moroccan regeneration, whose ultimate goal would have 
been the articulation between the quarantine administrations of 
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‘African Spain’ and those of ‘peninsular Spain’, whose organisation was 
being accomplished in parallel. As Quim Bonastra shows in  Chapter 
1 , an 1886 Royal Order creating the  Cuerpo de Sanidad Marítima and 
another one in 1887 that fi xed its  Reglamento (regulations), culmi-
nated the process set off  by Spain ’ s 1855 Health Law. Th ese regulations 
gave offi  cial status to the three foul lazarett os which were operating 
in practice on Spain ’ s extensive seaboard: Mahón, in the Mediter-
ranean Sea; San Simón, in the Atlantic Ocean; and Pedrosa, in the 
Cantabrian Sea. 92 
 If lazarett os acted as maritime border-markers for states (as Daniel 
Panzac has argued sanitary cordons did for land borders), 93 these par-
ticular ones fi xed the contour of Spanish national sanitary frontiers. It 
was, however, easy to see that the southern frontier was exposed, a 
serious and persistent problem owing to the presence of the British 
enclave of Gibraltar. Although Gibraltar applied stringent quarantines, 
as John Chircop explains in  Chapter 8 , they were not coordinated with 
Spain ’ s; above all, Gibraltar prevented the establishment of a foul laza-
rett o in Algeciras that would have undoubtedly hindered the Rock ’ s 
sanitary independence and commercial activity. Th e second sanitary 
border problem, of a rather diff erent nature, concerned the Canary 
Islands, an archipelago located almost 1,000 km southwest of Spain, 
facing the Saharan coast beyond the Moroccan port town of Agadir. 
Canarian authorities had been demanding the construction of a foul 
lazarett o since at least 1811, when the archipelago had been struck by a 
massive yellow fever epidemic. 94 Subsequent epidemics (the yellow 
fever outbreaks of 1838, 1846–47 and 1862–63 and the cholera out-
break of 1851) showed, as I have argued elsewhere, that the Canary 
Islands were more linked from a sanitary and epidemiological point of 
view to Cuba than to Spain in that period. 95 Th is odd fact was never-
theless consistent with the singular relationship established between 
Spain and Cuba during the middle decades of the century, an intimate 
and weakly hierarchical link between an ‘overseas Spain’ and ‘peninsular 
Spain’ which served as a model for the late nineteenth-century ‘African 
Spain’ project. It was only when that particular relationship began to 
change, aft er the Ten Years ’ War (1868–78), that the Canary Islands 
moved towards reintegration within Spain ’ s sanitary borders. A Royal 
Order of 10 February 1882 approved the creation of a fourth national 
foul lazarett o in Gando (Gran Canaria). 
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 However, I argue/suggest that Spanish regenerationist plans for 
Mogador Island competed with Gando ’ s project in subsequent years 
and became a decisive factor behind the latt er ’ s constant delays and 
ultimate lack of use. Gando ’ s works did not start until 1887, the build-
ings were not fi nished until 1893, the equipment did not arrive until 
1899, and the quay and road needed for the access of passengers and 
goods were never built. 96 As a result, when new  Sanidad Exterior regu-
lations were passed in 1899 and 1903, which substituted lazarett os for 
 estaciones sanitarias following the new doctrinal orientations prevailing 
at the eleventh ISC held in Paris, Gando had not yet been used. 97 It 
would be just once in 1906, with unsatisfactory results, before being 
abandoned in 1911 in favour of the newly built  estación sanitaria  of the 
port of Las Palmas. 98 In our opinion, Gando and Mogador were mutu-
ally exclusive because they refl ected the incompatible conservative and 
progressive approaches to the ‘African Spain’ project. Mogador ’ s success 
would have made the archipelago dependent on Morocco in sanitary 
and epidemiological terms; Gando ’ s supremacy would have turned the 
Canary Islands into an all-powerful and largely autonomous sanitary 
department with prerogatives over Morocco ’ s Atlantic coast (including 
the Saharan protectorate). Th e options could not be more disparate for 
Canarian interests. Both of them implied, however, a close articulation 
of Spanish and Moroccan maritime sanitary frontiers that would have 
reduced the exposure of both territories to imported epidemic threats 
( Figure 3.5 ). 
 Constructing an elite of ‘Moors’ 
 Regenerationist projects in Morocco rested on a specifi c discourse 
about the local society and its inhabitants. To assimilate such a dis-
course automatically to the orientalist narratives produced by other 
European countries in that period would again be misleading. Edward 
Said affi  rmed in his ground-breaking book of the same title that ‘orien-
talism’ was ‘a Western style for dominating, restructuring and having 
authority over the Orient’. 99 As such, it constructed a dualistic, irre-
ducible opposition between the West and the East, which from the 
eighteenth century onward framed the former ’ s humanistic, artistic and 
scientifi c views to help deploy and perpetuate its dominance over the 
latt er. Th e origin and rise of orientalism were intimately associated with 
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the second wave of colonial expansion that placed most of Africa and 
Asia under European rule. However, researchers have pointed out the 
existence of ‘multiple orientalisms’ (for example, the various national 
traditions in Europe) and the subsequent need for ‘situating’ them in 
‘time and space’. 100 Frederick Cooper has argued similarly for colonial-
ism not to be taken as a universal, immutable reality, but as one intrinsi-
cally contextual and performative. In his opinion,
 Th e weighty -ity in such widely used words as coloniality or postco-
loniality implies that there is an essence of being colonized independ-
ent of what anybody did in a colony […] Colonizer and colonized are 
themselves far from immutable constructs and such categories had to be 
reproduced by specifi c actions. 101 
 Figure 3.5  Map of the maritime sanitary borders of ‘peninsular Spain’ and 
‘African Spain’, 1890s. 
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 Following Cooper, I suggest colonialism and orientalism showed signif-
icant variations according to the specifi c characteristics of each domi-
nant power and each dominated society in a given historical period. 
Contemporary Spain was an example of such variability. Certain 
authors have already pointed out that Spanish nineteenth-century ori-
entalism possessed distinctive features when compared to its European 
counterparts. 102 On the one hand, it was almost exclusively ‘Arabist’, 
with very minor production on the Ott oman Empire or the Far East – 
despite the proximity of the Spanish Philippines to China and Japan. 
On the other hand, such ‘Arabism’ paid less att ention to contempo-
rary societies over which Spain sought to impose colonial domination, 
than to the ‘domestic Orient’ or ‘Spanish Orient’ of Al-Andalus estab-
lished on the Iberian Peninsula from the eighth century to the expul-
sion of the  moriscos in 1609–14. 103 Th ese specifi c features of Spanish 
orientalism were actually inseparable from those of Spanish colonial-
ism. During the nineteenth century, Spain ’ s expansionist expectations 
became essentially confi ned to Morocco, a neighbouring Arab country 
on whose northern coast Spain possessed several outposts and whose 
history, far from being exotic, was closely intertwined with that of Spain 
for many centuries. It was, thus, a ‘domestic imperialism’, deprived of 
most of the geographic and cultural displacement associated with 
colonial expansion. 
 An eff ect of all this was that modern Spanish discourses concep-
tualised Moroccan identity in a fairly balanced way when compared 
with other European countries ’ production on various Arab/Oriental 
societies. Without ignoring the elaboration of stereotyped negative 
images during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, I argue there 
was a radical impossibility for modern Spaniards to defi ne Moroccans as 
‘others’. Th is alterisation defi cit, that is, the systematic recognition of the 
Spanish ‘us’ in the Moroccan ‘them’ (and vice-versa) would have been an 
outcome of ‘domestic’ orientalism and imperialism. 104 Th e proximity or 
confusion of identities was formulated in diff erent ways over the course 
of the century. Regenerationism produced its own version, in which 
the polysemic category of ‘Moors’ was given a central role by redefi n-
ing it in a very specifi c way. It is possible to analyse this in the works 
of Felipe Óvilo, despite the fact that his views on Moroccans changed 
signifi cantly over time. In his early essays, Óvilo subscribed to ideas of 
older authors, especially the Basque traveller José María de Murga, who 
followed French discourses on Algeria when he identifi ed fi ve ‘races’ in 
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Moroccan society: Arabs, Berbers, Moors, Blacks and Jews. 105 However, 
while the French judged the dichotomy Arab–Berber as the defi ning 
feature of Algerian society, Murga highlighted the central role of the 
‘Moors’ in Morocco. Following that trail, Óvilo considered the ‘Moors’ 
were ‘the most educated, rich and powerful part of the Maghreb […] 
all positions that entail honours and riches are occupied, in most cases, 
by these Moors, who exploit the members of other races only to be 
exploited themselves by the Sultan’. 106 Th ey were descendants of ‘Mau-
ritanians [Berbers], mixed with Phoenicians, Syrians, Greek-Romans, 
Vandals, Arabs, Spaniards and Blacks’ and their number had risen, espe-
cially in coastal cities, aft er the successive expulsions from Spain of Gren-
adines and  moriscos. 107 Many ‘Moors’ had their origins in ‘not few of our 
ancestors’, and among those residing in towns ‘the European type is so 
abundant and it is possible to see men so similar to those of our southern 
provinces that there is no doubt about it’. 108 If Óvilo blamed the Moors 
for having ‘all the vices and the slyness’ of the  razas mezcladas  (mixed 
races), judging them a ‘race meant to disappear soon by consumption’, 109 
he affi  rmed nevertheless that only ‘a tenth of their faults has its origin 
in their natural condition; the other nine parts owe to the pernicious 
organization and absurd regime which oppresses them’. 110 
 It is evident that the centrality ascribed to the ‘Moors’ in Morocco 
by Murga and Óvilo was due to their perceived historical, cultural and 
racial links with Spain, to a Hispano-centric interpretation. However, 
while the former author actually considered Spanish ‘renegades’ that 
still existed in Morocco the ideal foothold for Spanish imperialist inter-
ventions, the latt er assigned that role to ‘Moors’. Th e key for Óvilo was 
their ‘mixed’ racial stock, which gave them a sort of proto-national 
potential for articulating a ‘Moroccan’ identity and nationality. Beyond 
the atomisation that characterised Murga ’ s vision, ‘Moors’ were for 
Óvilo not just a race among others, but a ‘Moroccan’ elite that ruled 
the country. Th e study of that elite corresponded, thus, more to political 
analysis than to anthropology; Óvilo identifi ed two groups of asym-
metrical size bound together by opposite ideological affi  nities. Along a 
larger conservative section, he found that
 although very weak, there exists a group in Morocco which is not so 
reluctant to advances and progress as most of the powerful people of that 
country; this fraction, tied together by its friendship with and sympathy 
0012-c03-9781526115546.indd   88 2/14/2018   2:28:30 PM
Hajj, cholera and Spanish–Moroccan regeneration 89
for the Great Vizir [Muhammad bin al-Arbi al-Jami ’ i], comprises 
Muhammad Dukali, Abdulkarim Brisha and their friends. 111 
 In later works, published during his second stay in Tangier, Óvilo, while 
still making use of Murga ’ s racial categories, stopped using them as 
analytical tools. His political inquiries focused now especially on the 
‘progressive’ sector of the ‘Moorish’ elite, which had expanded in size 
and power and from which he chose his most important associates. 
To the individuals mentioned before, he now added detailed descrip-
tions of two other members of the al-Jami ’ i family, the brothers Hadj 
al-Maati and Muhammad al-Saghir, who occupied various higher posi-
tions at the court and the government; of Si Faddul Gharnit, Minister 
of Foreign Aff airs in various periods ( Figure 3.6 ); of Sidi Muhammad 
Torres,  naib in Tangier from 1885 to 1906; and of some high-level gov-
ernment and army offi  cials (Ahmad al-Sueiri, al-Kerdudi, Muhammad 
al-Seff ar, al-Belghuti). 112 Th e progressive group was still a minority and 
his infl uence restricted, but Óvilo believed its advance refl ected the fact 
that Sultan Hassan I had started a ‘regeneration drive’ by designating 
 Figure 3.6  Portraits of ‘Moors’ Si Faddul Gharnit and Muhammad al-Seff ar, 
by Enrique Simonet, 1894. 
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administration offi  cials ‘aft er personal merit instead of intrigue, hitherto 
sovereign in the Maghreb’. 113 
 If progressive ‘Moors’ were to be co-opted for constructing the 
Spanish–Moroccan elite that would lead the process of regeneration, a 
discourse was required that emphasised the social, historical and cul-
tural similarities on both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar. Th us, Óvilo 
began by defi ning the present state of Morocco as one of ‘profound 
decay’, 114 in line with the regenerationist diagnostic of Spanish society. 
Such a situation would have had its ultimate origin in the loss of the 
heritage transferred to Morocco from ‘that feared and blooming Muslim 
state which passed over in Granada; [of] that Hispano-Arabic people 
who wrote such brilliant pages  of our glorious history ’. 115 Th e ‘wreckage’ 
and ‘eclipse’ of that heritage, within which the ‘sciences and the remains 
of Hispano-Arabic art’ had occupied an outstanding place, would have 
been aggravated by the decision of Spanish authorities to destroy and 
burn ‘thousands’ of books and documents rather than ‘allowing their 
owners to take them’ to North Africa. For Óvilo, this conduct that 
pleased ‘the fanatics who applauded that action’, had had negative con-
sequences for Spain too. 116 In sum, Óvilo regarded Granada as a ‘His-
pano-Arabic’ polity marking a zenith in the history of Spain  and 
Morocco, its fall being detrimental for both countries, an inaugural sign 
of their longlasting parallel decline. 
 Th e project of regeneration promised to put an end to the above-
mentioned decline by acting on both shores of the Strait of Gibraltar. 
Th us, it did not intend to construct a strongly subordinated Moroccan 
‘other’. Instead, a weak process of alterisation would distinguish those 
Spaniards  and Moroccans joining hands for modernising reforms from 
those opposing them. Th e regenerationist ‘us’ would have included 
Moroccans and the immobilist ‘them’, Spaniards. (Actually, ‘Moors’ 
were not the only Moroccan group reserved an active role in those 
regeneration plans. An elite of Jews would have played an even more 
important role, based on equivalent narratives of ‘Hispano-Sephardism’. 
We cannot develop this point further here as it is not directly relevant 
to the main topic of this chapter.) Modern, hispanophile, progressive 
‘Moors’ would have been socially produced and reproduced through 
various initiatives of higher education and instruction, either civil or 
military; through foreign policy and commerce; through books and 
paintings. Th e competition of other European powers for hegemony in 
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Morocco and local opposition to the sultan ’ s reforms endangered this 
process, including those threats pertaining to the fi eld of public health. 
 Mending ‘Moors’ on Mogador Island 
 Th e pilgrimage to Mecca was one of the main political and sanitary 
threats to ‘Moors’ and regeneration. Th ere were several reasons for this, 
which require a previous account of developments in the Moroccan  Hajj 
before the 1890s. In that period, substantial transformations occurred 
in line with general developments in the Islamic world. Th e number 
of Moroccan pilgrims making the cherished once-in-a-lifetime visit to 
the Holy Sites showed a rising tendency, though with cyclical ups and 
downs. By the early 1880s, the yearly fi gures had reached 5,000/6,000 
pilgrims, with ships usually carrying from 1,000 to 1,500 each. 117 Th e trip 
to Mecca had changed from the traditional caravan route across North 
Africa to the Egyptian Red Sea coast into a much faster journey by vessel 
fi rst and steamship later, from Tangier to Alexandria, where the trip con-
tinued by caravan or ship. When the Suez Canal was opened, the direct 
journey from Morocco to the Hejaz ports became possible. British and 
French lines carried most pilgrims, too oft en in very unsanitary condi-
tions due to overcrowding and a lack of medical staff  on board. 118 None-
theless, competition between shipping lines also made the journey more 
aff ordable and led to social diversifi cation among pilgrims. 119 Finally, as 
already argued, European pressure on the sultans led to unprecedented 
bans on the pilgrimage when the risk of importing an epidemic from 
Mecca was too high, as occurred in 1897. 
 Th ese changes increased the potential impact of the  Hajj on Morocco. 
From a political point of view, pilgrims were exposed to European 
modernity, either in the ships that carried them to Mecca or during 
stops in French Algeria or British Egypt that put them in contact with 
Islamic societies transformed by European colonialism. Moroccan pil-
grims were also exposed to ideologies of Islamic cultural and intellec-
tual revival ( nahda ), Muslim religious reform (salafi sm, wahabbism), 
and national and transnational (Pan-Islamist, Pan-Arabist) patriotism, 
all of which encouraged self-esteem and a rejection of European domi-
nation over Islamic countries. 120 As Óvilo pointed out in 1881, ‘a reli-
gious precept the sultans are unable to forbid, the pilgrimage to Mecca, 
pulls to pieces the precautions aimed at preventing the infi ltration of 
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certain ideas in the brains of Moroccans, who […] do not lack common 
sense and compare their condition with other peoples and make refl ec-
tions which surely do not enhance the prestige of their own political 
organization’. 121 For example, Hassan bin Muhammad al-Rassal, the son 
of a Tangier ’ s  amin (custom inspector), who did the pilgrimage in 
1897–98, praised in his travel diary the ‘magnifi cent outlook’ of Algiers 
and its ‘huge stores fi lled with rich merchandises’; Malta ’ s ‘remarkably 
well built and carefully looked aft er’ vegetable market and the ‘superb’ 
governor ’ s palace equipped with ‘state of the art cannons’; and the ‘great 
development’ of commerce in British-controlled Cairo, where ‘streets 
are quite large and well-kept as they are in Europe’. 122 At the same time, 
Moroccan learned men were also bringing back home from their trip 
to Mecca ‘the teachings of the famous Egyptian scholar Muhammad 
Abduh and his disciple Rachid Rida’, 123 the fathers of Salafi sm. Th e 
renowned Abdallah ibn Idris al-Sanussi would be forced into exile 
during Hassan I ’ s reign for his fervent defence of that doctrine. 
 From a sanitary point of view, the pilgrimage ’ s eff ects intensifi ed too. 
Th e growing speed of maritime communications implied now the risk 
of a direct and much faster importation of cholera from Mecca. Th e 
fourth pandemic that spread to Europe for the fi rst time by sea from 
Alexandria in 1865 – and put the  Hajj at the centre of discussions in the 
International Sanitary Conferences for the rest of the century, as Peter 
Baldwin has shown 124 – had already exposed Moroccan vulnerability by 
posing major threats in 1865 and 1866 (as said before) that brought 
about European intervention in public health, especially through the 
authorisation of quarantines on Mogador Island. 125 In 1878 and 1895, 
cholera brought directly from the Hejaz by  hajjis struck the country, in 
marked contrast to the epidemics of the fi rst two thirds of the nine-
teenth century, which had all been introduced by land from Algeria 
except the one that took place during the Spanish–Moroccan War of 
1859–60, which arrived partly from Spain too. 126 Cholera, oft en in asso-
ciation with famine, could trigger social revolts capable of shaking the 
weak structures of the state and even the sultan ’ s authority. As Óvilo 
commented for the 1878 epidemic, ‘cholera and other calamities 
brought Morocco to such prostration that […] it was easy to foresee 
one of those historical cataclysms which mark the disappearance of a 
people’. 127 Otherwise, pilgrims grew familiar with modern quarantine 
facilities and procedures, especially at the lazarett o of El Tor in Egypt 
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and Matifou in Algiers, such that they realised the sanitary backward-
ness of their country. But they could also become increasingly sensi-
tised to sanitary interference in a religious, saintly aff air, as the incidents 
on Mogador Island in 1893 and 1896 revealed. 
 All these reasons made the  Hajj a threat for Spanish projects of 
regeneration and creation of a ‘Moorish’ elite. With regard to politics, 
the experience of British and French modernity in Algeria or Egypt and 
the fact that the journey was almost always made in British and French 
steamships could lead ‘Moor’ pilgrims to realise the modesty of Spain ’ s 
projects in their country and its second-rank position in international 
politics, commerce or colonialism. On the other hand, they could be 
tempted to abandon their ‘Hispano-Arabic’ identity for a more att rac-
tive religious adscription as ‘Muslims’, ethnic condition of ‘Arabs’, cul-
tural ‘Islamic’ background or political ‘nationalism’. From a sanitary 
point of view, the pilgrimage threatened to discredit regeneration pro-
jects. Every time pilgrims imported or were suspected of cholera, the 
British and the French renewed their criticism of the Sanitary Council 
of Tangier and Mogador Island lazarett o despite Spanish-sponsored 
reforms. Epidemic risks justifi ed their att empts at direct intervention in 
Moroccan public health or their plans for obliging Morocco to adopt 
international schemes. For example, in the convention resulting from 
the tenth ISC held in Venice in 1897, the French successfully included 
a plea to the sultan such that ‘the Sanitary Council of Tangier adopts 
preventive measures against plague in harmony with the resolutions 
contained in the agreed convention’. 128 Th is strategy would be repeated 
in the following conference in Paris in 1903, where Lucien Raynaud 
was invited to present on the troubled state of Moroccan quarantines. 129 
Finally, disinfection and isolation procedures imposed on pilgrims on 
Mogador Island were liable to trigger opposition against sanitary 
reforms from Morocco ’ s conservative elites and popular masses. 
 For all this, regenerationist discourses and practices att empted to 
frame the Moroccan  Hajj . Th e result was a loosely articulated vision 
that stood far from the ‘twin infection’ schemes already prevalent in 
French Algeria or British India at that time, as Luc Chantre and Saurabh 
Mishra have shown. 130 From an ideological point of view, as Óvilo 
argued in his study  El cólera en Tánger  (1895), the  hajjis were believed 
by regenerationists to be ‘moved by a religious idea and sanctifi ed by 
it’, that is, the pilgrimage was essentially regarded as an enriching and 
0012-c03-9781526115546.indd   93 2/14/2018   2:28:30 PM
94 Space
positive spiritual experience. 131 We may infer that Óvilo also saw it as a 
means of ‘spiritual regeneration’ for the elite of ‘Moors’, so that they 
developed a ‘healthier’ mentality and abandoned ‘vices’. On the other 
hand, ‘Moors’ were considered as the central or characteristic actors of 
the Moroccan pilgrimage. Th us, the Spanish minister in Tangier was 
glad to inform the minister of foreign aff airs in 1889 about the ‘quality’ 
of the ‘considerable’ number of  hajjis leaving for Mecca that year. 132 
Such ‘quality’ was marked by the presence of several important ‘Moors’, 
among which he mentioned the son of the  caid of Meknes, accompa-
nied by ‘sixty relatives and friends’ and Ahmed ibn Shucron, an army 
colonel who had been trained as an engineer in the Spanish Military 
Engineering School in Guadalajara in the late 1870s, who travelled in 
the company of ‘fi ve brothers’. 133 Medical care of the pilgrims was 
assigned to the previously mentioned Hamed Romani, of privileged 
social extraction too. All three were outstanding examples of ‘Moors’ 
targeted by, and actively involved in, regenerationist plans. 
 With regard to public health, Óvilo thought that the pilgrimage 
posed no essential risk of cholera epidemics and pilgrims were not 
sources of infection in themselves. On the one hand, he put the blame 
on the French and the British for the unsanitary conditions in which 
the  hajjis travelled: they were just ‘poor creatures that come back to 
their country aft er long suff erings […] on board ships that profi t and 
greed transform […] into infamous stores in which passengers are 
carried and treated a thousand times worse than in those used for the 
 ebony traffi  c [i.e. the slave trade]’. 134 On the other hand, he judged pil-
grims not ‘a very dangerous element by themselves, but just by their 
eff ects’. 135 As they had acquired some ‘immunity’ against cholera aft er 
being exposed to it in Mecca, it was unlikely that the disease would 
break out in their ranks during their return to Morocco. As a result, 
there was just one thing to be feared: if the germs pilgrims carried 
within their bodies or in their clothes and luggage spread to the general 
Moroccan population, the consequence would be a disastrous epidemic 
due to the latt er ’ s lack of immunity and bad health condition, as well as 
the precarious state of the sanitary administration beyond coastal areas. 
Óvilo acknowledged ‘the lack of a good sanitary organization’ in 
Morocco 136 and that it was ‘not fair, from a sanitary point of view, to 
consider Morocco at the same level than other nations that march at 
the front of civilization’. 137 
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 It seems clear that, for Óvilo and the regenerationists, most ‘Moors’ 
were capable of dealing with the ideological and sanitary risks of the 
 Hajj without much disruption for their modern, Hispanophile, identity 
and their rather healthy condition. However, it was also clear that a few 
of them would surely become ‘dis-eased’, 138 however surreptitiously, 
during the pilgrimage with the risk that they could trigger an epidemic 
if they came in contact with the general population. Th us, a site was 
needed for mending the dis-eased ‘Moors’ and protecting Morocco 
both in ideological and sanitary terms. Mogador Island was perceived 
as the best place from a regenerationist point of view. With regard to 
politics, it was highly symbolic that the site was located in front of 
Mogador, the most European city in Morocco. Mogador had been built 
anew in the 1750s and 1760s, during the reign of Sultan Mohammed 
III, who decided it would be the only port authorised for international 
commerce and promoted the sett lement of Jewish and European mer-
chants for that purpose. 139 Mogador was, so to speak, the Tangier of the 
eighteenth century and, as happened with the city of the Strait, Span-
iards claimed to have played a decisive role in its development. Accord-
ing to Francisco Merry y Colom, Spanish minister in Tangier in 
1860–72, Mogador had been ‘designed and built’ by Spanish renegades, 
its walls were similar to those of Cádiz and most of the cannons defend-
ing them had been given as a present by Spain. 140 Th e commercial 
prosperity of the city owed much to the ‘fraternity’ and ‘friendship’ 
between Carlos III of Spain and Mohammed III, the latt er of whom 
tried, according to Merry, to ‘regenerate’ his country with Spanish 
support. 141 In sum, pilgrims isolated on Mogador Island were literally 
exposed to the earliest example of Spanish–Moroccan modernity. 
Staring at the city over the waves, they would feel reassured in their 
‘Moorish’ mentality and forget any disruptive European, Muslim, 
Islamic or nationalist ideas acquired during the pilgrimage. 
 From a sanitary point of view, Mogador Island was established in 
the only suitable place for quarantine that existed in the whole Atlan-
tic litt oral of Morocco. Its tiny size and its proximity to the seaboard 
and the city – the usual reasons invoked for criticising its use – were 
actually very similar to the three foul lazarett os existing in Spain. San 
Simón Island in the fi ord of Vigo, Pedrosa Island in Santander Bay and 
the Lazarett o Island in Mahón Bay were similarly small and close to 
the mainland and/or nearby cities. Th e only real diff erence was that 
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it was far easier to disembark passengers and luggage in them because 
they were completely protected from the open sea. But there were 
no protected sites on the Atlantic coast of Morocco and those that 
were closer to fulfi l this and the rest of the required conditions in the 
Mediterranean were Spanish outposts. In sum, Mogador Island was 
suitable as a lazarett o and Spanish-led reforms further improved this 
status. Besides, in front of it there was a city in the design of which 
public health had played a central role. As the British traveller Joseph 
Th omson put it in 1889, Mogador was ‘the best-built and cleanest-
kept place in Morocco’. 142 Its medina (old town) was made of ‘spa-
cious houses, clean squares and straight streets’ and it had the ‘unique 
distinction’ of having been built with ‘a partial sewage system’. 143 
While staring at the city over the sea, Moroccan pilgrims would be 
reassured of the relevance of Spanish–Moroccan sanitary initiatives, 
which neither religion should oppose, nor European criticism could 
downplay. 
 Conclusion 
 In March 1900, Moroccan authorities recruited Lucien Raynaud to 
organise the quarantine on Mogador Island. When he arrived there, 
most pilgrims had already come back from Mecca, so just thirty 
would be confi ned in the island and no more would arrive during the 
summer. 144 Th e following year, Raynaud, joined by Dr Gagé, repeated 
the operation, with 177 pilgrims undergoing quarantine this time. 145 
During the rest of the decade, however, when the risk of epidemic 
existed, either the pilgrimage was banned or the quarantine of Moroc-
can pilgrims was performed in Algiers ’ Matifou lazarett o. In spite of a 
French doctor being assigned to Mogador Island at least until 1911, the 
site was neither used nor modernised. 146 Instead, Raynaud lobbied the 
Sanitary Council and Moroccan authorities so that a modern lazarett o 
was built in Tangier. An international commission searched for the 
best location in 1901 and two projects were draft ed for a complex in 
Malabata Point by two diff erent private enterprises, but nothing was 
actually done. 147 Th e abandonment of quarantines when a comprehen-
sive public health system was still a distant project resulted in small foci 
of plague striking the country from 1909 in anticipation of a massive 
outbreak in 1911 – which caused 10,000 dead in Dukkala – with minor 
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episodes recurring in the newly established French and Spanish pro-
tectorates in subsequent years. 148 Plague brought by pilgrims and com-
merce but, above all, extended through the continuous and extensive 
military operations of France and Spain, would remain a severe threat 
for Morocco at least until 1929. 
 Parallel to this, the  Hajj stood behind the wave of Islamic reformism 
that swept through Morocco in the fi rst decade of the twentieth century. 
According to Ett y Terem, some Moroccan scholars ‘were exposed to 
Muslim reformers while on the pilgrimage to Mecca; others came 
under the infl uence of  hadith scholars in Egypt and the Hejaz while on 
the pilgrimage’. 149 For example, in 1903–04, the  ulema Muhammad ibn 
Abdalkabir al-Kitt ani did the pilgrimage with expenses paid by his ‘old 
friend the sultan’. 150 His family had been opposed to the rise of Euro-
pean infl uence in Morocco during the nineteenth century, but a further 
step was taken when, aft er his return from Mecca, al-Kitt ani became a 
pioneer of the Salafi ya movement in the country, campaigned against 
French reform proposals and even called for  jihad against foreigners. 151 
In 1908, the new Sultan Abdelhafi d invited Abu Shuaib al-Dukkali to 
return to the country from Mecca. Dukkali, a scholar trained in Cairo ’ s 
Al-Azhar University, where he became a follower of Salafi ya, had moved 
to Mecca to work for the Wahabite sharif Awn al-Rafi q. In Morocco, 
Dukkali reformed the syllabus of the Qarawiyin University in Fez, ‘was 
largely responsible for the spreading of Salafi yah doctrines among intel-
lectuals’ and, through his disciples, infl uenced the origins of the Moroc-
can national liberation movement. 152 
 Plague and Salafi sm were precisely the risks Spanish regeneration 
projects in Morocco, and more particularly those regarding the control 
of the Moroccan pilgrimage to Mecca, had tried to prevent during the 
last decade of the nineteenth century. Th eir appearance and diff usion 
in Morocco in the fi rst years of the new century showed how quickly 
such projects had become a failure aft er the fall of Spanish prestige in 
the country following the loss of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898. 
Th e new situation of the 1900s resembled more closely the realities 
and narratives of the ‘twin infection’ associated with the pilgrimage 
to Mecca in British India or French Algeria – though the limitation of 
French hegemony due to the participation of Spain in the division of 
Morocco and the international status granted to the city of Tangier still 
made the Alawite sultanate an unconventional case. When in operation 
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during the 1890s, Mogador Island had become a key material and sym-
bolic site of regeneration projects which, building on local modernising 
reforms promoted by the sultans, aimed at transforming Morocco into 
an ‘African Spain’ closely att ached to ‘peninsular Spain’ and producing 
an elite of modern, healthy, Hispanophile ‘Moors’. Much faster than 
expected, however, these projects became distant, blurred memories 
for both Spain and Morocco. 
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